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We understand the self-determination process to consist of the struggle by 
a people or group for control over their own destiny. These struggles may 
have a new secessionist state as their aim (e.g. the struggle for Eritrean 
independence); or more autonomy and political participation within a 
nation (e.g. the anti-apartheid struggle South Africa); or a major change in 
the values and organization of society (e.g. the anti-fundamentalist 
democratic struggle in Algeria). … A major hypothesis of our project is 
that these identities, which are constructed or accentuated by local leaders, 
are often heavily influenced by global cultural forces. (QEH Project 
Proposal) 
 
Introduction: Globalization, Islam and “Self-Determination” in Nigeria  
 
By way of background to our analysis of Muslim self-determination movements in 
Nigeria, it may be useful to explain the background of our project. The Santa Cruz 
project---Globalization, State Capacity and Islamic Movements---analyzes the impact 
that economic globalization exerts on the capacity of elites in eight national states to 
manage Muslim self-determination movements.  Even before “9-11” effectively 
tarbrushed all Islamic social movements as “terrorist” in the American imagination, we 
published a series of papers which guided the propositions posed in our Carnegie 
proposal. Below is a brief summary of our assumptions and arguments regarding the 
relationship of globalization and Islamic movements.  
 
(1) The social power of Muslim social and self-determination movements is correlated 
with the expansion and deepening of an informationally-driven regime of neo-liberal 
globalization, accompanied by rising social inequality, human insecurity, and 
disillusionment with the performance of post-colonial national states;  (2) Islamism 
represents an alternative political discourse that is simultaneously national and global, 
yet grounded in the authentic everyday cultural practices of observant Muslims, while, at 
the same time, promising them political and cultural liberation from Western hegemony, 
social justice in this world, and relief from national humiliation; (3) Islamist movements 
are diverse, pragmatic and modern in that they borrow eclectically from Western-origin 
organizational forms and political discourses in order to create organizations and deliver 
services demanded by the large, educated, cohorts of redundant youths residing in dense 
Muslim cities; (4) all the latter factors combine with the legitimacy crisis of weak, 
authoritarian states implementing structural adjustment programs so as to allow Islamist 
movements to capture the mantle of  populist, anti-imperialist nationalism, easily the 
most powerful political resource formerly controlled by secular nationalist and leftist 
movements; and finally,  (5) because information technology networks spearhead 
contemporary globalization, the new global infrastructures have inadvertently provided a 
superb communications network through which Islamist movements have constructed a 
globally networked anti-systemic movement that has proved to be the greatest challenge 
to the American-inspired project of liberal globalization (Lubeck, 1995, 1999, 2001, 
2001) (Lipschutz, 1999) (Lubeck and Lipschutz, 2000).   
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Rethinking the Globality of Islam 
 
As the project evolved and the global interconnectedness of Muslim movements became 
apparent, we have moved away from seeing Islamic movements solely as “reactive 
ethno-nationalist” responses to American-inspired neo-liberal globalization policies, or as 
veiled popular class responses to widespread dissatisfaction with the dismal performance 
of the crisis-ridden post-colonial state. To conceptualize Islamic movements as national 
and local responses to deprivations generated by the effects of neo-liberal restructuring, 
i.e. reactive ethno-nationalism in Wallerstein’s idiom, invariably defines Muslim 
movements as reactive, reactionary, anti-modern, and binary oppositions to the neo-
liberal restructuring of national societies.  While standard social movement theories have 
considerable explanatory power, they neglect the cultural/discursive and the global 
dimensions of our problem. Paradoxically, however, we know that Islam’s extensive 
global networks and transnational discourses predate Western imperialist expansion, the 
rise of neo-liberal policy, information and communication technologies (ICT), and the 
disillusionment with and decline of post-colonial secular states.  The historical legacy of 
Islam, therefore, forces us to rethink and reposition the role of Islam within more general 
theories of globalization. 
 
Relegating Islam to the local and national sites of action, while unconsciously reserving 
the global site for neo-liberal economic globalization, is not merely hopelessly Euro-
centric but profoundly counterfactual.  Why?  What is most distinctive about 
contemporary Muslim social activism is neither its local particularity nor its bounded 
nationality but, rather, its multifaceted and protean globality.  Muslim globality is 
manifest in the growing interconnectedness of spatially-separated Muslim communities, 
their global awareness of each other, their effort to base social and political action on 
standardized Islamic discourses, their transnational charity and educational networks and 
the increasing velocity of cross border flows through Muslim networks—people, 
scholars, students, finance, goods, media images and ideas.  What is new is the 
innovative organizational strength and pragmatic energy displayed by transnational 
Muslim networks promoting Islamist discourses and movements operating within the 
interstitial spaces that are paradoxically opened up by the forces driving neo-liberal 
economic globalization.  In the cultural realm, the globality of the post 1967 Islamic 
Revival has reintroduced concepts such as the Muslim nation and the transnational 
ummah, rendering a global Muslim identity one of several identity options available to 
the world’s Muslims (Hall, 1996). 
 
Accounting for the autonomous and extensive globality so manifestly present in 
contemporary Islamic movements requires a repositioning of Muslim structures of 
globalization in our cognitive map.  To correct this methodological flaw, an adequate 
explanation must not limit globality solely to neo-liberal forms of economic 
globalization, marked by their indelible American slant, rather it should allow for the 
autonomous impact that a conscious and autonomous global Islam exerts on local and 
national movements. Only by integrating the global and local dimension of Islam will one 
explain the impact that long standing transnational Islamic institutions, networks and 
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Nigeria.  The test of this theoretical repositioning depends upon our ability to compare 
global Muslim movements to their Western counterparts.  Practically this means we must 
show how transnational Muslim networks and discourses impact Muslim social 
movements in national states like Nigeria, with the same analytic clarity that Keck and 
Sikkink demonstrate for the effect that transnational advocacy networks exerted on 
transnational emancipatory movements championing abolitionism, gender equity, human 
rights and environmental sustainability. (Keck and Sikkink 1998).   
 
We resolve the tension between economic globalization and global Islam by 
conceptualizing them as mutually constitutive social forces operating at the global level, 
each with its own domain of power.  While neo-liberal economic globalization dominates 
production, technology and warfare, global Islam operates through the social and cultural 
politics of a “moral economy”, envisioning a transnational and national polity that 
conforms to Islamic norms if not an Islamic state.  At the current moment, both struggle 
for hegemony and discursive power within national states, yet both are networked into a 
powerful arsenal of global institutions and discourse operating above the nation-state.  At 
its core, global liberalism is a discourse privileging freedom, self-interest, accumulation, 
growth, innovation, efficiency, consumerism and individual responsibility within the 
confines of the nation-state.  In contrast, Islam is a discourse privileging community, 
social justice, redistribution, enterprise, social regulation, membership in a transnational 
community and, in practice, a claim for national autonomy vis a vis the hegemonic 
powers managing the capitalist world economy.  Ontologically, therefore, they are 
complementary rather than inevitably competitive with many significant overlapping 
similarities.   
 
Ironically, the technological success of neo-liberal globalization has inadvertently 
strengthened the communication capacity, interconnectedness, cultural autonomy and 
self-awareness of the spatially dispersed members of the global Muslim community.  
Muslims resist some, but certainly not all, aspects of the economic, political and cultural 
agenda promoted by neo-liberalism, and this resistance takes global forms often using the 
global infrastructure of economic globalization. As we shall see, this dialectical process is 
working itself out in and through the political life of the Nigerian state, in which the local 
and national expression of neo-liberalism and Islam are each linked to their respective 
global counterparts.  
 
Turning to the organization of this paper, after providing a brief overview of Nigeria, we 
outline our argument concerning the impact of economic globalization and global Islamic 
movements on the capacity of national states to govern effectively.  Our objective is to 
assess how globalization and Islam impact the capacity of national states to manage 
Muslim demands for self-determination expressed either as a call for establishing an 
Islamic state, an alternative Islamic project or greater regional autonomy.  After 
discussing our general arguments, we turn to an analysis of the Sharia movement for self 
determination in twelve states located in northern Nigeria, a movement that challenged 
national identities, provoked inter-communal conflict and threatened the existence of the 
Nigerian federation.  
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Nigeria under Global Restructuring: A Brief Overview 
 
As Africa’s most populous state (130 million), roughly divided between Muslims and 
Christians, the Federation of Nigeria is pivotal to the both the global liberal and the 
global Muslim projects.  Once a successful exporter of smaller holder produced tropical 
commodities, Nigeria is now integrated into the world economy through its total 
dependence on petroleum exports, much of which flows to the USA.  Economically, 
Nigeria represents a sad tale of venality, chaos and human misery despite extraordinary 
human and natural resources.  To list the causes: total dependence on the distribution of 
petro-rents, an overextended state whose bloated and technically incompetent 
bureaucracy (e.g. petrol and electricity supplies) has mismanaged the economy, and a 
deserved reputation for economic anarchy, lawlessness and social disorder.  All of which 
has destroyed once promising manufacturing sector with an internal market greater than 
any African or Western European nation-state, and at this stage, eliminated any 
incentives for disciplined capital accumulation either by Nigeria’s entrepreneurial classes 
or by foreign investors.  Because of intense competition among Nigeria’s 300 ethnic 
groups for access to state-controlled petroleum rents, the Islamic/Christian division often 
overlays sharp regional and ethnic divisions, thus sharpening the communal competition 
for the distribution rents generated by the export of petroleum and natural gas.   
 
Legitimate governance has been fragile since gaining independence in 1960.  Yet, to the 
credit of Nigerian nationalism, despite a civil war, widespread ethnic conflict, brutal 
military and police actions, and pervasive corruption among a circulating elite, Nigeria 
has remained united and remarkably optimistic about its future leadership role in Africa. 
After sixteen years of military rule, only ending with the death of the wantonly brutal 
dictator, General Sani Abacha, in 1998, Nigeria is now engaged in its third effort to 
institutionalize liberal democracy under President Obasanjo.  No democratically elected 
government has ever completed a second term without a military coup.  While the Third 
Republic under Obasanjo is widely viewed as corrupt, incompetent, and incapable of 
managing Nigeria’s economic, security and social problems, it is also noteworthy that 
salaries are being paid to public servants, civil society groups are thriving, and press and 
media expression is exuberantly free.  It is no mean feat to keep Nigeria together in a 
region marked by state collapse. 
 
To understand why Sharia is widely popular in the twelve northern states one must 
compute the accumulated weight of Nigeria’s economic and social problems since the 
collapse of the petroleum boom in 1981. Space permits only a listing: widespread 
criminality, police corruption and vigilantism, the breakdown of the administration of 
justice and public services, political corruption of every imaginable form, declining 
standards of living coupled with rising educational standards, and a gigantic proportion of 
the population under the age of 30 (i.e. 72 %).   Generational experiences are critical for 
understanding the discursive shift to Islamism.  Today’s much better educated generation 
now entering their mid-twenties has only experienced economic decline, institutional 
decay, authoritarianism, and rising poverty especially among the new, urban middle 
classes. In 1980, when Nigerian petro-revenue reached $24 billion, the per capita income 
was estimated at $1140; today it is estimated at $ 260 (World Bank, 2002).  For 2000, the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 6 
UNDP estimates that 70.2 per cent living under $1/day and 90.8 percent live under 
$2/day. 
 
The trend in poverty rates and the distribution of poverty within Nigeria suggest that the 
northern Sharia states rank among the poorest with the least access to amenities, health 
and other government services (Nigeria, FOS, 1999).  Table 1 and 2 present estimates of 
recent poverty trends calculated by the Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics (FOS).  From 
1980 to 1996, the absolute number in poverty increases from 17.7 million to 67.1 million 
and the relative proportion of Nigerians in poverty increases from 28.1 percent to 65.6 
percent respectively.  Tables 3 and 4 are especially valuable because they provide an 
estimate of the decline of the middle class, a theoretically significant category.  The 
tables show that the non-poor, i.e. the middle and secure working classes, decline from 
72.8 percent to 34.4 percent of the population by between 1980 and 1996.  Turning to the 
relative poverty of Sharia states, Table 5 confirms that the incidence of poverty is 
generally higher in Sharia states than non-Sharia states, reaching 83 percent of the 
population in the poorest five Sharia states.   
 
Estimates of poverty in the Sharia states are complemented by the excellent analysis of 
nutrition and health standards by Nigerian Muslim scholars at Ahmadu Bello University 
(Mohammed, Adamu and Abba, 1999, www.ceddert.com/Article2.htm).  To summarize: 
the occurrence of stunting, wasting, and underweight among infants was higher in the 
Northeast and Northwest region in 1990, as were other health measures such as potable 
water; life expectancy, literacy and educational attainment are generally lower in the 
Sharia states; and access to electricity (i.e. less than 8 percent of households in the 
northern states) and opportunities for industrial employment are significantly lower in the 
Sharia states.   The paper concludes that “Islamic justice requires that we attack the 
causes of poor health among our people” and with a quote from revered 18th century 
reformer, Usman dan Fodio, who wrote “A kingdom can endure with unbelief, but it 
cannot endure with injustice.”  
 
Recent unilateral declarations of Sharia by 12 of Nigeria’s northern states, effectively 
constituting a claim to self-determination and religious autonomy, have been associated 
with rioting, pogroms and the breakdown of pubic order.  In the Nigerian case, claims for 
self-determination and autonomy are multiple and extremely complex. Northern Muslims 
claim autonomy based upon the Sharia issue.  Meanwhile, their ethno-national rivals, the 
Yoruba (estimated to be half Muslim), are demanding the convening of a sovereign 
constitutional convention in order to promote their vision of a decentralized and 
restructured loose confederation. Movements in the oil producing Delta Region demand 
control over indigenous natural resources, and compensation for the environmental 
damage caused by petroleum and natural gas extraction.  Conflicts between ethnic groups 
and security forces in this region resulted in the closure of a major proportion of oil 
production facilities in March 2003.  Because of these demands for self-determination 
and new internal political structures, Nigeria is an ideal case study to challenge any 
simple theory or empirical generalization regarding the relationship of globalization and 
self-determination movements.  The resolution of self-determination claims and the 
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Africa’s largest democracy.  With this overview we now turn to an elaboration of more 
general argument and a historical outline of the globalization process for the eight states 
of interest.   
 
Overview: Globalization, Islam and Self-Determination Movements 
 
Our primary hypothesis in this paper is that globalization processes disrupt relations 
between states and political communities, weakening the state’s ability to deliver 
expected material resources, sustain “national” identities and govern Muslim 
communities. In various ways, increasing integration into a hyper-competitive world 
economy, accompanied domestically by liberalization, privatization, and deregulation 
policies, undermines the capacity of post-colonial state elites to absorb youthful 
demographic cohorts into the national project.  Large, educated and frustrated cohorts of 
youth made redundant by the intersection of political crisis and decades of liberalization 
become disillusioned with the failures of their rulers and, for a number of reasons, 
embrace the alternative discursive political project promised by Islamism.   Unless states 
successfully adjust to globalization, therefore, counter-hegemonic elites mobilize these 
discontented groups into Islamist social and regional movements that challenge the 
legitimacy and survival of the post-colonial institutional order.  At the same time, 
however, individual national outcomes vary widely, depending on state cohesion, the 
capacity to adjust to globalization, regional autonomy, ethnic and class relations and the 
institutional and cultural content of Islam.   
 
Under the condition of rapid global restructuring and the social disruptions that invariably 
result, Islamic-inspired movements mobilize transnational, national, and regional 
networks to support Muslim claims for autonomy, state power, and new international 
borders. Accordingly, our task is to understand under what conditions these movements 
thrive and under what conditions states manage to contain them.  Most importantly for 
this project, Islamic movements are not theorized here as simply reactive or bi -nary 
responses to the penetration of global liberalization. Indeed Muslim transnationalism or 
globality, in fact, predates the global expansion of Western-origin liberalism. Thus we 
argue that Islamic institutions, networks and discourses constitute an alternative form of 
globalization that is both distinct from, yet flourishing opportunistically within, the 
interstitial spaces created by the new infrastructures defining the new global economic 
and political system. Framed in this way, we then analyze the capacity of national states 
like Nigeria to govern Muslim communities under the constraints posed by the tensions 
exerted by both Islamic and the economic liberal forces of globalization.     
 
Globalization, Sovereignty and Declining State Capacity  
 
Globalization is best understood as a set of interrelated processes that extend, deepen, and 
speed up the “interconnectedness” of spatial organizations, social relations, and 
transaction flows (economic, cultural, social) across increasingly porous national borders 
(Held and McGrew, 1999). Organizationally, globalization promotes flexible economic, 
social, material, and cultural networks within and around the territorially-embedded, 
bureaucratic national state. Globalization is embedded as both cause and effect in the rise QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 8 
of competitive free market policies--often called “neo-liberalism."  Institutions promoting 
economic globalization demand liberalization of the economy, competitiveness, new 
export markets, and open capital and currency regimes.  They promote “floating” 
exchange rates, privatization of public industries, deregulation of economic and financial 
institutions, transnational subcontracting networks for manufacturing and, more 
generally, the competitive marketization of all material, cultural, and institutional 
resources.   
 
One frequent result of globalization is the disruption of well-established state, class and 
coalitional relations of power and authority that, for better or worse, have provided 
domestic stability and cohesive national identities since the Keynesian era (Lipschutz, 
1998).  Sadly, state collapse is an increasingly common outcome in Africa. A recent 
study by the UNDP of major interstate conflicts from 1989-99 concludes that 57 of 61 
conflicts began as civil wars and not interstate conflicts (UNDP, 1999).  Accordingly, our 
objective is to analyze the conditions and policies under which national states 
successfully manage globally linked Muslim social movements. The disruptive processes 
associated with economic globalization, of course, are mediated within states by many 
factors: federal constitutions, organizational capacity, export commodity dependence 
(oil), and ethno-national composition.  These factors vary among states and, as a result, 
the specific outcomes, and success or failures of states, differ from one to the next.  At 
the same time, there are certain parallels among the eight countries on which we focus in 
this project, in the sense that each has gone through a similar set of historical “phases” 
that have structured domestic contexts and which continue to affect outcomes.  We shall 
return to this argument, below.  
 
The Impacts of Globalization 
 
Globalization processes impact the national state and Muslim communities in at least  
three distinct ways:  
 
Globalization, liberalization and economic change:  Globalization has both enriching and 
impoverishing impacts, but they are disruptive and usually contribute to domestic instability.  
On the one hand, globalization is correlated with rising inequality and, in some cases such as 
Nigeria and Africa in general, with declining real incomes. Economists, of course, debate 
whether and where incomes declined in real terms during the era of rapid neo-liberal 
globalization (Watkins, 2002).  Whatever rise in real incomes, which occurred mostly in 
East Asia and parts of Latin America, the period since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
the global economic slowdown since “9-11” have certainly reduced real incomes for the 
majority of the world.   
 
There is little debate, however, about rising relative income inequality under globalization.  
According to the UN Development Programme, in 1960  “20% of the world’s people in the 
richest countries had 30 times the income of the poorest 20 %---in 1997, 74 times as much” 
(UNDP, 1999:36).  The polarization of assets and income is startling.   The world’s three 
richest people hold more assets than the combined GDP of a group of less developed 
countries with a total population of 600 million people (UNDP, 1999:3).  The income of the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 9 
200 richest people in the world exceeds the combined income of the poorest 2.5 billion 
people (UNDP, 1999:38).  At the same time, the economic opportunities opened up by 
globalization in countries in transition are also threatening to established structures of power 
and wealth.  The managers of public, parastatal and even private enterprises discover that 
they no longer have access to state-provided resource flows, a source of rents and patronage 
to sustain coalitions among economic and political elites.  
 
Structural adjustment policies administered by multi-lateral agencies have produced a 
surplus of unemployed college graduates, declines in employment in privatized state 
industries, and deep generational differences. In states struggling to adjust, globalization has 
created an abundant pool of recruits for mobilization into militant Islamic movements 
seeking group rights, Sharia law, or alternations in the existing borders.  When entire labor 
forces are thrown out of work, managers and elites are in a position to scapegoat specific 
marginalized ethnic or religious groups.  State withdrawal from provisioning services 
creates opportunities for surplus graduates to create an Islamic alternative sector, or to invest 
in promoting Islamist political and social programs such as “Shariaization”. While this new 
domestic "division of accumulation" creates opportunities for recent secondary and tertiary 
graduates to build the Islamic alternative, it also leads to struggles that play out in the 
political realm. 
 
Globalization and state authority: For national states to sustain political coalitions and 
legitimacy, and to fix meaningful national identities, élites must manage economic growth 
and extend social services (education, health, consumer subsidies). Global market forces and 
multilateral regulatory institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) compel states to restructure 
the ways in which they make and implement economic policy decisions, allocate resources 
among different sectors of society, and regulate a broad range of domestic activities. It 
reduces the availability of material resources that states and communal and religious élites 
were formerly able to distribute to their clients as a means of maintaining social cohesion 
and political stability. Consequently, as responsibilities are shed or transferred and material 
resources dry up, globalization undermines the national state’s ability to manage the 
domestic economy, bind contentious ethno-national groups into coalitions, co-opt rival 
leaders, absorb new generations, mobilize citizens to affirm their national identity, and to 
effectively regulate harmonious and stable relations among competing and diverse groups. 
Under the conditions associated with globalization, the domestic social structures of any 
given state—the source of political stability—can rapidly lose their cohesion, calling into 
question the very foundations of a state’s constitutional existence (Crawford, 1998; 
Lipschutz, 1998).  
 
Globalization, information networks, and identities: Globalization affects the capacity 
of bureaucratic élites to manage the cultural capital that define cohesive national 
identities by simultaneously diluting state authority, state presence and, more 
importantly, exposing the populace to competing cultural identities now visible through 
new global communications and media (Appadurai, 1996). The new information 
technologies, together with cheap travel and other global infrastructures, facilitate the 
resurgence of Muslim globality, an identity never erased entirely by the forces of post-
colonial nationalism.  Aspirations for the restoration of Sharia reflect both a claim for QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 10 
“self-determination”, and an imagining of membership in a global ummah are now 
facilitated by the electronic imagery associated with globalization.  Burke coins the 
valuable term, a discursive shift to Islam, to capture this aspect of Muslim globalization 
(Burke, 1997).   
 
National identities are also challenged by increased flows of pilgrims, students, scholars 
and labor flowing through the new global infrastructures.  All of which increases the 
interconnectedness of Muslims and increases the social and cultural influences of Muslim 
diasporic communities on the consciousness, identity and resources of mobilized Muslim 
groups within a national state (Lubeck, 2000). The same technologies also connect 
locally-bounded citizens to globally dispersed members of highly-networked diasporas.  
Using new communications technologies to bridge long distances, political elites living in 
diasporic communities can easily communicate daily with constituents, helping to sustain 
oppositional Muslim movements.  Al-Qaeda’s strategy, for example, is inconceivable 
without the Internet and the global communications system. It is, in practice, a 
decentralized Castellian network rooted in the “space of flows” not the space of place; 
Islamism is embedded within the interstices of the global system, one that adeptly uses 
the American sponsored global information, communication and transportation system to 
wage war against the hegemonic powers (Castells, 2000).   
 
We should note that “global communication” is nothing new in the Muslim world. 
Historically, Muslim states, communities, and movements have always defined 
themselves as universal in terms of recruitment, global in spatial form, and transnational 
in terms of networks. Ironically, despite the contemporary Islamist demand for 
centralized, authoritarian Islamic states--a wholly modernist invention--the distinguishing 
feature of Muslim civilization has been the conferring on individuals of common status 
and privileges based upon membership in a transnational political community of 
believers, the ummah, regardless of one's original birthplace (Hodgeson, 1974; Lapidus, 
1988). Transnational networking, moreover, has been enhanced by the Muslim obligation 
to undertake, during one's lifetime, a pilgrimage (hajj) to shrines in Arabia. Admission to 
the shrines as a pilgrim, in actual practice, defines who is a valid Muslim. Pilgrimage 
authorities, including non-Saudis, enforce Muslim boundaries for the entire Muslim 
world. Together, travel, Islamic scholarship, long distance trade, and pilgrimage 
obligations have combined to etch a web of networks composed of Muslim communities 
across Europe, Asia, Africa, and increasingly, the Americas.   Contemporary 
globalization processes have, therefore, fused two intertwined yet distinct kinds of 
globalization, the historically Muslim and the contemporary global capitalist systems. 
 
In other words, national states, whose authority is constrained by liberalization of 
finance, telecommunications, and other tools of economic sovereignty find themselves 
besieged not only from within but also from without.  They are engaged in growing 
struggles to manage the aspirations for greater autonomy and political power voiced by 
Muslim activists residing within their territories. Yet,  oppositional leverage is bolstered, 
as well, by the wealth, networks, informational capacity and cultural power of globalized 
diasporic communities operating without, in the EU, the United States, other Muslim 
majority states and the large global ummah.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 11 
 
The National Context 
 
We hypothesize that these three dimensions of globalization challenge the capacity of 
national states to manage Muslim activists while, at the same time, providing support for 
Muslim activists seeking domestic and international support for self-determination, group 
rights, regional autonomy and even changes in international borders. As intervening 
variables, variations in state organizational capacity, constitutional structures, and ethno-
national composition mediate the impact of these three dimensions of globalization on 
Muslim political activity.   We further hypothesize that states that successfully adjust 
their economic and political strategies to the liberalizing global economy will be more 
successful in asserting their legitimacy, thus containing and rationalizing Muslim 
demands for autonomy, group rights, and Muslim law. Finally, our research seeks to 
identify and explain the effects that specific dimensions of globalization have on state 
capacity and the mobilization of Muslim movements and, further, to identify within states 
those institutions and practices that explain variations in states' ability to cope with 
revitalized Muslim movements.   
 
In the following outline we suggest in a preliminary way how globalization processes 
have differentially impacted upon the eight states of interest.  We are interested in 
understanding the institutional and cultural conditions that allowed some states to adjust 
far better than others. In addition we are concerned with how global Islamic networks, 
institutions and discourses are internalized in different ways in each national state.  
  
Globalization and State Capacity: Understanding Historical Sequences 
 
Phase 1: The colonial legacy (pre-independence): With the exception of Turkey which 
emerged after World War I from the Ottoman Empire, seven of the eight countries went 
through a colonial period.  Both Egypt and Turkey achieved “independence” after World 
War I; the other six between 1948 and 1960. This period is critical in setting in place both 
domestic governmental systems and class and ethnic structures.  The latter was often 
structured either through systems of indirect rule, which carried over into the post-
independence period and may continue to exist, even today, or by the privileging of 
certain groups over others in order to create collaborating élites for the colonial and post-
colonial projects.   
 
Phase 2: National state-building (independence to 1967/1970): All eight of our cases 
went through periods, after independence, in which governing élites sought to put in 
place state-building projects.  The designers of these projects sought to establish state 
legitimacy, both nationally and internationally, by creating autonomous, industrialized 
economies as well as cohesive national identities.  The European nation-state was the 
model to be emulated, although the particular forms varied.  Thus, Kemal Attaturk tried 
to reproduce the secular, liberal state in Turkey, with some success, while Gamel Abdul 
Nasser and Algeria attempted to implement “Arab Socialism,” which tried to fuse 
nationalism, populism and state economic intervention into a developmental model. 
Others like Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan combined rule by precolonial QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 12 
elites, emerging middle classes and military officers in market economies. In the long 
run, however, all of the eight were too dependent on external financing and investment to 
go it alone, so the state-building projects could not be sustained without adjusting to the 
new winds of globalization.  It is noteworthy that the Arab defeat, widely perceived in the 
Muslim world as a Muslim defeat, in the Six Day War (1967) occurred at the same time 
as the crisis of state-centered import substitution and just prior to the OPEC price 
revolution.   
 
Phase 3: Global Shock: the Petroleum boom and bust cycle (1973-1982): The OPEC 
price revolution destabilized the economies of oil importers, oil exporters and suppliers 
of labor, services and goods to the Gulf States.  For those blessed with oil, the enormous 
increases in national incomes provided funds for all kinds of social subsidies, including 
much larger secondary and post-secondary enrollments.  These monies also distorted 
domestic prices and labor supplies in critical sectors (such as agriculture), and helped to 
institutionalize political economies of corruption and rent seeking.   Petroleum revenues 
thus created much more extensive and greedy rentier political elites, who presided over 
autonomous state-centered economies but were largely uninterested in productive social 
structures of accumulation.  Unimpeded by market discipline, the power of disciplined 
accumulating classes and the fiscal constraints normally demanded by taxpayers, the 
results were nothing short of disastrous (Karl, 1997).   
 
Such distortions had impacts even those countries with little or no oil resources, such as 
Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan.  These were affected through their reliance on oil 
transshipment incomes, export good markets, labor remittances from workers in oil-rich 
countries, and foreign assistance provided to them as "strategic partners" in defense of 
Western geopolitical interests.  Ironically, the petro-dollar surpluses accumulated in the 
most conservative Gulf states, who then institutionalized global networks promoting the 
most illiberal and authoritarian interpretations of Islamic practice.  
 
Phase 4: Globalization, liberalization, and structural adjustment:  As oil revenues 
dried up in the early 1980s and neo-liberal structural adjustment policies were 
implemented globally, domestic social subsidies for food, education, and health were 
reduced (even as corruption continued). Over time, infrastructure crumbled, and external 
pressures grew to liberalize as a means of opening up economies to diversification, 
foreign investment, and the universalized promises represented by export-led growth.  
Prior policies encouraging secondary and post-secondary education and the privatization 
of labor-absorbing state industries created a frustrated reservoir of disappointed middle 
class recruits for Islamic movements as well as impoverishment and unemployment, 
which have acted as push factors behind flows of emigrants from some countries through 
diasporic networks into Europe.  At the same time, Islamic networks have provided 
alternative social organization via communications, movement, and institutions.  These 
Islamic networks are put in place by social movements, domestic and transnational, 
which also offer a “parallel polis”, redistribution mechanisms, and the possibilities for 
action by those who oppose the regimes in place. 
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In some instances, as in the states of northern Nigeria and parts of Indonesia, 
liberalization under the boom and bust of the petro-economy has been catastrophic, with 
Muslims and Christians at each other's throats.  In other cases, as in Turkey, Malaysia 
and India, liberalization has provided opportunities for an emerging and vocal Muslim 
middle-class, one not necessarily welcomed by the political and economic elites in the 
former cases, or the Hindu majority in the latter.  Malaysia, Turkey and, before the Asian 
financial crisis, Indonesia adjusted far better than others to economic globalization.  By 
2000, however, the positive economic growth generated by global liberalization had 
stagnated and the Washington Consensus sustaining the project was shattered by 
recrimination and popular movements (Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
Phase 5: Empire and Islamic Assertion (2001- ???): The September 11, 2001 attacks 
on New York and Washington, DC mark a new phase whose precise form and outcome 
cannot be easily, nor wholly predicted.  The American response in Afghanistan and the 
Anglo-American war on Iraq have destroyed the strategic coalitions upon which liberal 
global governance was constructed at the end of World War II.  Throughout the Cold 
War and the 1990s, the American desire to protect its access to oil resources led not only 
to support for authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes but also the suppression of 
left-nationalist groups and parties throughout the Islamic world, oftentimes by cynically 
supporting Islamic social movements against the latter.  Consequently, in most situations, 
Islamic movements became the only channels through which political dissatisfaction and 
dissent might be expressed both because of the vitality of these movements and the 
support they received from the authoritarian elites backed by Washington.  “Blowback” 
haunts the psyche of American strategic planners as never before (Johnson, 2000).  
Today, even moderate Muslims are having serious doubts about the American project to 
democratize the Muslim world by force and the legitimacy of America’s client regimes.  
It is not out of the realm of possibility that one result of the invasion of Iraq and its 
aftermath will be their collapse and replacement by Islamic governments. 
 
With the sequential schema in mind, we now turn to analyzing the rise of the Sharia 
movement in Nigeria from its pre-colonial origins to the present phase.   
 
Contextualizing the History of Sharia Movements in the Northern States of Nigeria 
 
In April 2001 the Nigeria Muslim Forum (UK) sponsored an international conference in 
London entitled “The Restoration of Shariah in Nigeria- The Benefits and Challenges” 
(www.shariah2001.nmnonline.net).  Discursively understood, by accenting the 
restoration of Sharia back to Muslim Nigerians, the organizers tried to position their 
project within the anti-imperialist, nationalist discourse of Islam, and in opposition to the 
discredited secular nationalist legal system introduced by British imperialism.  We have 
no doubt that the restoration of Sharia criminal law is widely popular and that it would 
win by a landslide if put to the vote.  Whatever their private chagrin and misgivings, few 
if any critical intellectuals identified with human rights and progressive politics have 
publicly opposed the idea of restoring Sharia criminal law.  Instead, their criticism 
focuses on the interpretation of Sharia, the ignorance of the judges and vigilante police 
(hizbah), the outrageous gender bias in its enforcement, the interests of the poor, the lack QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 14 
of preparation, and the absence of codified law.  Many share S. L. Sanusi’s suspicions 
regarding “the method and timing of its implementation”, because the governor of 
Zamfera state introduced Sharia in the criminal code several months after the 
displacement of the northern Muslim oligarchy from the presidency (Sanusi, 2001, 
www.gamji.com/sanusi30htm).  Let us review the history of Sharia in Nigeria. 
 
Islam was introduced into the northeast states of the northern region as early as the 11th 
century by North African traders and scholars involved in the trans-Saharan gold trade.  
Gradually, rulers converted to Islam and Muslim scholars institutionalized Muslim law, 
literature and Muslim institutions as part of a strategy to construct a centralized, urban, 
bureaucratic state apparatuses over the lineage-based societies in the countryside.  The 
process was not linear. Tensions arose between Muslims associated with long distance 
trade, urbanity and Muslim legal scholarship and leaders of indigenous communities 
associated with lineage-based agrarian practices (i.e. sacred groves, land priests, ritual 
and fertility rites expected from rulers), pre-Islamic beliefs and customary practices.  
Authors of Muslim manuscripts record periods of Muslim reform followed by periods of 
regression to traditional and syncretic practices. Over the longer term, however, the 
discursive power of Islam and the institutions of a Muslim mercantile economy gradually 
became embedded in the cultural practices of the diverse societies in what are now the 
Sharia states of northern Nigeria.   
 
In the later decades of the 18th century, the region was transformed by a revolutionary 
reform movement led by Usman dan Fodio, a charismatic Muslim scholar influenced by 
the Islamic revival centered in Mecca and Medina.  The “Shehu” (shayk) began 
preaching against the “backsliding” rulers of the Hausa-speaking city states accusing 
them of injustices, corruption, illegal taxation, tolerating un-Islamic practices and 
repression of what Hodgeson calls “Sharia-minded” Muslims (Hodgson, 19XX).  By the 
middle of the 19th century Fodio, his brother Abdullahi and his son Mohammed Bello had 
constructed a geographically vast and multi-ethnic Muslim empire ---the Sokoto 
Caliphate---extending across northern Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon and even into 
Yoruba-speaking regions of Illorin.  The Caliphate ranks as one of largest and most 
complexly organized pre-colonial African states, one that was recognized in the wider 
Muslim world.  Organizationally, the Caliphate was ruled by a highly differentiated 
Muslim ruling class of prebendal officeholders, and a community of Muslim scholars that 
together extended the spatial boundaries of Islam and the cultural depth of Islamic 
practice.  Meanwhile, the relative peace and expansion of trade also extended the security 
and intellectual reach of Muslim scholarly and trading networks---the ulama--- who 
formed a powerful status honor group whose support was required to legitimate the 
taxation and governing practices of the Muslim officeholders.  
 
Islamic law provided the cultural cohesion that enabled the rulers and ulama to 
administer one of Africa’s most extensive and complexly organized agrarian bureaucratic 
empires. The Caliphate was urbanized, highly commercialized, peopled by a free and 
slave-origin peasantry and administered by literate bureaucrats. It’s indigo cotton and 
leather handicraft manufactures were traded across West and North Africa.  With the 
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Sharia, a population numbering a million or more people from Niger to Cameroon. While 
emirates like Kano may have rebelled and sectarian differences arose among believers, 
the territorial, economic and cultural integrity of the Caliphate under Sharia law remained 
intact until the British conquest in 1903.  
 
Drawing upon their practices in India, British colonial policy institutionalized “indirect 
rule” by rationalizing the practices of the pre-existing Muslim administrators at the 
lowest cost to the imperial treasury. To summarize: slave raiding and trading were 
abolished but not slavery; higher taxes, forced labor and other forms of domination by the 
ruling class over the commoners were buttressed by the technical power of the British 
empire; Muslim district heads were placed over non-Muslim subjects and Christian 
missionaries banned from proselytizing in Muslim areas; traditional juridical checks on 
autocratic power were eroded; and most importantly, Islamic law was institutionalized 
and rationalized throughout the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria usually by borrowing 
from British legal institutions already established in Sudan and Egypt.  According to the 
authoritative view of Anderson: 
 
[T]he case of Northern Nigeria was, indeed, almost unique, for up till 
[1960] this was the only place outside the Arabian Peninsula in which the 
Islamic law, both substantive and procedural, was applied in criminal 
litigation—sometimes even in regard to capital offences. . . (Anderson, 
1976). 
 
In practice, this meant that the British suspended punishments like stoning for adultery 
and amputation for theft, but sustained a Sharia-based civil and criminal code and a court 
system under the authoritarian rule of emirs and their clients. Ironically, for the 
commoners, Islamic social movements, educational institutions and cultural practices 
thrived under the improved security, transportation infrastructure and commercial 
protection afforded by British rule. During the final decades of colonial rule, however, a 
popular Islamic revival led by sufi brotherhoods appeared among urban-based Muslim 
scholars and the commercial classes of merchants and craftsmen, transforming the areas 
of education, female seclusion, mysticism, pilgrimage and public piety.  
Organizationally, the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods spearheaded this movement 
and extended their network of scholars, schools and mosques throughout the colonial 
transportation infrastructure and throughout the commercial and cultural networks of 
West Africa.  
 
Global Discourses of Rationality: “Religion and the Decline of Magic” Redux  
 
“In all these different ways the Protestant Reformers rejected the magical 
powers and the supernatural sanctions which had been so plentifully 
invoked by the Medieval Church. In Protestant mythology the Middle 
Ages became notorious as the time of darkness, when spells and charms 
had masqueraded as religion and when the lead in magical activity had 
been taken by the clergy themselves” (Thomas, 1971 ,68) 
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To grasp the Sharia movement as a self-determination movement, one must understand 
the practices of the Sufi brotherhoods and the conflict their practices incited among the 
contemporary Salafi-inspired Islamist movements, which, in northern Nigeria are 
associated with greater global integration into the new global discourses.  Salafi reform 
movements are directly linked to the discourses and networks of the Muslim Brotherhood 
of Egypt and reformers influenced by Saudi Wahabbi movements.  The intense discursive 
struggles involved violence, mass movements and declarations of apostasy (takfir) 
especially against the Sufi brotherhood leaders.  For this reason, Salafi attacks on Sufi 
and popular religious practices are analogous to the Protestant Reformers described in 
Keith Thomas’ classic study.  
 
The charismatic leaders who founded brotherhoods claim to have a mystical insight into 
the experience of the divine, oftentimes realized through a dream or supernatural 
experience.  Once members are initiated into the brotherhood’s ritual practices by leaders 
(muqaddams), their lineage of initiation is ranked according to proximity to the 
brotherhood founder or the Prophet and multiple lineages are eagerly sought by 
brotherhood members.  In practice, membership in a brotherhood like the Tijaniyya or 
Qadiriyya involves gnostic knowledge, secret prayers, chants, trances, drumming and 
claims of special mediation through to their founder to Allah or the Prophet.  Because the 
Salafi reformers accept only the Qur’an, the Sunnah (authenticated Prophet statements 
and behavior) and the legitimacy of the four rightly guided Caliphs succeeding 
Mohammed, they reject as innovations all of the ritual trappings and gnostic claims of 
Sufi brotherhoods.  Specifically, Salafi’s reject “intermediaries” between individuals and 
Allah including efforts to project sainthood onto Mohammed, the mystical insights 
claimed by charismatic Sufis, veneration of the saints anniversaries or their tombs, or any 
suggestion that charms, relics, waters, or other forms of magic contain sacred power.   
Finally, Sufi brotherhood leaders were attacked for tolerating a popular industry of 
itinerant, uneducated ulama (mallams) who earned a living making charms, amulets or 
writing verses on wooden slates which are then washed off and consumed as a religious 
potion, (rubutun sha). 
 
Initiation networks of brotherhoods proved to be highly valued networks for merchants 
and Muslim scholars under colonial rule when few had access to formal political 
institutions or courts. Most importantly, the initiate accumulates grace (baraka) through 
the ritual inter-mediation of his shaykh and not through the individual’s Islamic 
knowledge and/or direct communication with God.  While Sufi brotherhood leaders claim 
distinct gnostic insights only available to followers through rituals, they may also claimed 
association with prodigious Islamic scholars and writers like Usman dan Fodio who was 
an initiate of the Qadiriyya.  Lastly, when the independence movement emerged in 
Muslim northern Nigeria during the 1950s, contending politicians attempted to mobilize 
brotherhood networks, symbols and resources so as to gain political advantage over their 
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Globalization and the Sharia Movement Revival in Nigeria 
 
Faced with economic decline, ruthless authoritarian rulers, endemic corruption and 
widespread personal and social insecurity, young Nigerians have become disillusioned 
with the post-colonial state.  Not surprisingly, all sections of society have turned to 
religion for solace, solidarity and alternatives.  Both Christian and Muslim revivalists are 
inspired by and closely linked to globalized networks for new ideas, material support and 
new strategies of conversion.  At the same time, religious authority, both Christian and 
Muslim, has become increasingly fragmented with new globally linked activists 
appearing to challenge existing hierarchies of power.    
 
Fragmentation of authority and globally linked Islamic movements lie at the heart of the 
Sharia movement.  Among Muslims in the northern states, the Izala, or the Society for the 
Eradication of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna, constitute the most 
influential revival movement since the onset of globalization and the petro-boom bust 
cycle. Their name derives from a treatise written by Usman dan Fodio so they seek to 
represent themselves as successors to the reformers who established the Sokoto 
Caliphate.  The inspiration for Izala and the power behind the movement was Abubakar 
Gummi (died 1992), an Arabic teacher, former Grand Kadi of Northern Nigeria and 
principal beneficiary of Saudi and Gulf state patronage in Nigeria.  Because of his close 
links since the 1950s with the Saudis as Nigeria’s pilgrim agent, his critics label him a 
Wahabbi and a tool of the Saudis. But this characterization as we shall see is too partisan 
for his scholarship and pragmatic policies reflect greater vision, much broader affiliations 
with the world Islamist  movements as well as the influence of revolutionary writers such 
as Sayyid Qutb from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.    
 
Under Gumi’s powerful intellectual and financial direction, the Izala was founded in 
1978 in opposition to the practices and beliefs of the Tijaniyya and, to a lesser degree, the 
Qadiriyya brotherhoods.  In step with Wahabbi and Islamist reformers in the Muslim 
world, Gumi declared the practices of Sufi brotherhoods to be innovations that lacked 
roots in the Qur’an or the practices (Sunna) of the Prophet and his immediate companions 
(Salafi).   Instead, the Izala exhorted the faithful to accept no intermediaries between 
themselves and God, to reject Sufi mysticism as innovative superstition, to refuse to 
tolerate popular forms of magic in the form of potion and charms and to take 
responsibility as individuals to become learned in Islamic knowledge.  Most importantly, 
the Izala castigated the brotherhoods for excessive hierarchy and for failing to educate 
women in Islamic studies.   Soon the Izala established gender segregated classes for 
women and support for women’s’ Islamic organizations like FOMWAN, the Federation 
of Muslim Women’s Organizations of Nigeria. In addition, the Izala appealed to newly 
educated youth whose aspirations for material security were threatened by attacking 
excessive brideprice and marriage payments.   
 
Labeling the Izala as fundamentalist distorts the global and modernist dimensions of their 
program.  To summarize: the Izala’s emphasis on individual responsibility, their 
embracing of the ethic equality before God without mystical intermediaries, the rejection 
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support for the grievances of younger Muslims seeking to form families suggests the 
rationalization if not the modernization of religion is in a way analogous to that of 
Protestant reformers.  For this reason, unlike the brotherhoods whose support depended 
upon established merchant classes, the Izala’s support was drawn mainly from modern 
secondary school and university graduates, educated women, civil servants and 
communities located outside of the main commercial centers (Loimeier, 1997).  Besides 
their shared material deprivation as salaried workers, these groups also possessed the 
educational capital to instruct themselves in Islamic law and to keep abreast of 
intellectual issues debated within the wider global networks that increasingly integrated 
the world’s Muslim community. 
 
Sharia as a Globally Networked Self-Determination Movement 
 
The Sharia movement in the 12 northern states is popularly legitimated and would win if 
put on the ballot.  On one hand, it arises from the consequences of economic 
globalization and the crisis of the post-colonial state. On the other hand, the Sharia 
movement is promoted by groups like the Izala with strong linkages to the global Islamic 
networks operating within Nigeria.  Let us review the reasons why Sharia is popular and 
why Sharia is unlikely to result in the separation of the northern states from the 
Federation of Nigeria.   
 
Demands for Sharia have been on the political agenda in one form or another since the 
Constitutional Assembly debates of 1976-77.  It is also represents the northern Muslim 
response to the demands of southern groups for greater regional autonomy. Lewis’ survey 
data shows that two thirds of Muslims from the northern states and 38% of Muslims from 
southern states favor increasing Sharia.  Scholars such as Murray Last believe that, since 
states retain all powers not formally allocated to the federal government, subnational 
states possess the right to implement Sharia law at the criminal level and to create police 
and courts to enforce Sharia.  Others insist the federal government will never permit cruel 
punishments like the stoning of alleged adulterers who are usually powerless, uneducated 
women. No decision has been made by federal courts and no one has been stoned to 
death yet.  
 
Sharia advocates argue that not only has Sharia been the basis of civil and personal law 
among consenting Muslims since independence, but that the Nigerian criminal law is 
derived in large part from Sharia.  Islamists appeal to populist, anti-imperialist sentiments 
when they argue that the post-colonial secular state was imposed upon Nigeria by 
colonial powers regardless of the will of the large Muslim minority.  Additional 
arguments focus on the failure of the Nigerian court system to function effectively, the 
corruption of judges, the lack of a speedy trial often resulting in periods of incarceration 
while awaiting trial exceeding the normal sentence if convicted and the widespread 
knowledge of the principles of Muslim law and jurisprudence (fiqh) in the general 
population.  
 
It is readily apparent that the Sharia movement is a regional expression of the global 
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Sharia arises because of Nigeria’s mismanaged dependence on petro-rents and the failure 
of the post-colonial state to manage the national economy.  The widespread breakdown of 
law and order, the arbitrary violence and criminality of the police and security forces and 
the disillusionment with the post-colonial secular state fuel the popular movement.  
Among the impoverished and insecure in northern Nigeria whose malnutrition and 
poverty is amply documented, Sharia promises a popularly legitimated blueprint for a just 
and secure moral order.  These groups expect, and to some degree have received in the 
Zamfara State, access to foodstuffs that Sharia requires be collected from the wealthy, i.e. 
Zakat, and distributed to impoverished members of the Muslim community.   
 
We conclude with the question of whether the Sharia movement will move from 
autonomy to the breakup of the Nigerian federation. This outcome is very unlikely and 
virtually impossible to imagine as a policy pursued by the elites of the northern region.  
Why?  To date, all sources of petroleum and natural gas exports are located in the 
southern states, mostly on the lands of small ethnic groups and increasingly in offshore 
zones.  Secession by the northern states will be economic suicide because of Nigeria’s 
complete dependence on energy exports to finance the domestic economy.  In the last 
instance, therefore, the structural bonds linking Nigeria to the global economy effectively 
eliminate the independence option for even the most ardent advocates of Sharia.   In lieu 
of independence, however, the Sharia movement has unified, to some degree, the badly 
fragmented solidarity among northern Muslims, a solidarity that they require in order to 
claim their share political power and, of course, petro-rents.  
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Table 1 
 
Proportion of Nigerians in Poverty* 1980-1996 
Year  Poverty Level 
Estimated Total 
Population 
Number of Nigerians 
in Poverty 
1980  28.1%  65.0 million  17.7  million 
1985  46.3%  75.0  million  34.7  million 
1992  42.7%  91.5  million  39.2  million 
1996  65.6%  102.3  million  67.1  million 
 
Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996; Federal Office of Statistics, April 1999 
 
 
    Table 2 

































Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996; Federal Office of Statistics, April 1999 
 
 
*The poverty line in Nigeria is defined as any household living at or below two thirds of the mean per capita 
expenditure on a fixed basket of food and non-food items. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS106   Page 21 
      Table 3 
 
Poverty Trends Among Non-poor (NP), Moderately Poor (MP) and Core Poor 
(CP) 1980-1996 (% in Poverty) 
Year  Non-poor  Moderately poor  Core poor 
1980  72.8  21  6.2 
1985  53.7  34.2  12.1 
1992  57.3  28.9  13.9 
1996  34.4  36.3  29.3 
                                     Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996; Federal Office of Statistics, April 1996 
 
 
    Table 4 
Poverty Trends Among Non-poor (NP), Moderately Poor (MP), and 















































                       Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996; Federal Office of Statistics, April 1999  
 
Proxy for estimating poverty rate:  Total Real per Capita Expenditure 
Classes:    
Non-poor (NP)    - above 2/3 of the mean per capita expenditure in Nigeria 
Moderately poor (MP)  - between 1/3 and 2/3 of the mean per capita expenditure in Nigeria 




Incidence of Poverty (%) by Sharia/non-Sharia States 
State  1980  1985  1992  1996 
Anambra/Enugu  12.8  37.7  32.3  51.0 
Bauchi/Gombe  46.0  68.9  68.8  83.5 
Edo/Delta  19.8  52.4  33.9  56.1 
Benue  23.6  42.9  40.8  64.2 
Borno/Yobe  26.4  50.1  49.7  66.9 
Cross River/Akwa Ibom  10.2  41.9  45.5  66.9 
Adamawa/Taraba  33.4  47.2  44.1  65.5 
Imo/Abia  14.4  33.1  49.9  56.2 
Kaduna/Katsina  44.7  58.5  32.0  67.7 
Kano/Jigawa  37.5  54.0  38.7  71.0 
Kwara/Kogi  33.3  39.3  60.8  75.5 
Lagos  26.4  42.6  48.1  53.0 
Niger  34.0  61.4  29.9  52.9 
Ogun  20.0  56.0  36.3  69.9 
Ondo  24.9  47.3  46.6  71.6 
Oyo/Oshun  7.8  28.3  40.7  58.7 
Plateau  49.5  64.2  50.2  62.7 
Rivers  7.2  44.4  43.4  44.3 
Sokoto/Kebbi/Zamfara  25.4  45.8  37.9  83.6 
FCT        27.6  53.0 
ALL NIGERIA  28.1  46.3  42.7  65.6 
Sharia States  35.7  56.5  42.8  70.9 
non-Sharia States  21.8  44.4  44.0  61.2 
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